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Trading Places: Illicit Antiquities,
Foreign Cultural Patrimony Laws, and
the U.S. National Stolen Property Act
after United States v. Schultz
By MARK J. PETR*
Introduction
Even before the recent and widely-publicized looting of Iraqi
cultural institutions in the aftermath of war, the active trade in art and
antiquities of dubious provenance has been an important concern of
the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York
because, just as New York City is one of the world's important
financial centers, it is also one of the most important centers of the
world's art market.' The U.S. Attorney's Office there has persistently
advocated the position that the national ownership laws of foreign
nations allow prosecutors to consider property, such as ancient
artifacts, to be "stolen" for the purpose of prosecution under the U.S.
National Stolen Property Act (NSPA) . In the instance of antiquities,
the U.S. Attorney's Office only recently succeeded, however, with a
precedent-setting prosecution using the NSPA in the case of United
States v. Schultz.3 In 2003, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed and upheld the conviction of Schultz, a New York antiquities
dealer who sold ancient artifacts claimed by the government of Egypt
under its cultural patrimony law.' Dealers, collectors, and
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005.
1. Martha Lufkin, Schultz prison sentence upheld: "The same as material stolen
from a private home, " THE ART NEWSPAPER.COM, at
<http://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/article.asp?idart=11275> (Sept. 18, 2003).
2. Lufkin, supra note 1.
3. United States v. Schultz, 178 F.Supp. 2d 445, (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Schultz I"),
aff'd 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Schultz I"), cert. denied 124 S. Ct. 1051 (2004).
4. Schultz II, 124 S. Ct. at 416.
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associations representing their interests strenuously disagreed and
had filed friend-of-the-court briefs arguing that such treatment would
harm the legitimate trade in antiquities.5 Art dealer and collector
trade associations are concerned that in the aftermath of Schultz the
antiquities trade will be irreparably damaged.6 Critics of the trade in
antiquities make no secret that destruction of the trade is their goal,
finding little difference in effect between the trade in legally and
illegally acquired artifacts.' One critic of the antiquities trade,
Ricardo J. Elia, associate professor of archaeology at Boston
University has said, "People think that there is an illicit and a
legitimate market. In fact, it is the same."8 However, even under the
new Schultz regime there are strong reasons why legitimate traders in
antiquities could and should flourish and that increased enforcement
can work to the advantage and benefit of those who obey the law.
If the successful Schultz prosecution actually creates a reduction
in the number of illegally obtained antiquities on the market, the law
of supply and demand will put a price premium on legally obtained
and documented artifacts, resulting in higher per sale profits and
commissions for dealers. Likely, many of these items may be legally
obtained (or, because of the date of their acquisition, at least
"grandfathered" into the legal market) duplicates from museum
collections that would have remained in storage. Their sale will
generate funds to further legitimate institutional goals for the public
benefit. There also could be a greater likelihood that a higher
percentage of offerings of illegally obtained antiquities will be
recognized. With a lower volume of sales but a higher per sale profit,
legitimate antiquities dealers will have greater resources and more
time, as well as a bigger incentive, to properly research items offered
to them and by them. The result should be more identifications and
repatriations of illegally obtained antiquities.
5. Id. at 398.
6. American Society of Appraisers, Use of U.S. and Foreign Laws in Antiquities
Case Serves as Warning to Appraisers: American Society of Appraisers Joins Amicus
Brief to U.S. v. Frederick Schultz, at
<http://www.appraisers.org/news/announcedetail.cfm?announcementlD=268>
(visited Mar. 8, 2004).
7. Patty Gerstenblith, Ownership and Protection of Heritage: Cultural Property
Rights for the 21st Century: The Public Interest in the Restitution of Cultural Objects,
16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 197,201-11 (2002).
8. Barry Meier and Martin Gottlieb, Loot, Along the Antique Trail: An Illicit




The National Stolen Property Act (NSPA) and pre-Schultz
Caselaw
The NSPA
The NSPA of 1934 is a federal law that allows for prosecution of
those involved in the importing, exporting, buying or selling of
cultural artifacts that have been illegally obtained.9 It functions
through the recognition of foreign countries' cultural patrimony
legislation, allowing these foreign patrimony laws to be effectively
enforced inside the territory of the United States by U.S. courts."
Typically, such patrimony laws equate with theft the unauthorized
excavation or removal of artifacts from their archaeological context
within their country of origin. Importantly, such laws must not be
merely export prohibitions. In order to be effectuated in the United
States through the NSPA, the foreign country's patrimony law must
vest ownership of the antiquities in the government of their country
of origin."
There are two provisions of the NSPA that are most applicable
to trade in illicit antiquities. 2 The first is 18 U.S.C. § 2314, which
makes the transportation of stolen goods across borders in interstate
or foreign commerce illegal. The second provision is 18 U.S.C. §
2315, which makes receipt or sale of such stolen goods illegal. There
are, however, noted difficulties in pursuing criminal prosecutions
under the NSPA. Only three successful prosecutions for stolen
antiquities have been made using the NSPA since its inception.
There are three major elements to the text of section 2314 crucial
to prosecutions." "Whoever transports in interstate or foreign
commerce any goods, wares, for] merchandise of the value of $5,000
or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken
by fraud.... Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both.' 4 First, the language clearly covers those
9. National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2314, 2315 (2001) [hereinafter
"NSPA"].
10. Schultz II, 124 S. Ct. at 410.
11. Id.
12. Robert S. Schwartz, Note, In Schultz We Trust: The Future of Criminal
Prosecution For Importers of Illicit Cultural Property Under the National Stolen
Property Act, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 211, 218 (Spring, 2003).
13. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 219.
14. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2314 (2001).
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individuals who transport stolen goods (inclusive of antiquities) in
foreign commerce. Second, section 2314 grants the ability to
prosecute the actors who bring stolen cultural property into, or
transport it within, the United States, allowing for fines,
imprisonment, or both. Importantly, however, an element of scienter
is required for the offense to be criminal. This element of knowledge
that such antiquities were stolen is what has made prosecutions under
the NSPA difficult. 5 With antiquities long since removed from their
context, it is difficult to prove knowledge that the artifacts were
stolen.16
Section 2315 makes sale or possession of such cultural property
illegal:
Whoever receives, possesses, sells, or disposes of any goods, wares,
[or] merchandise of the value of $5,000 or more which have crossed
a State or United States boundary after being stolen, unlawfully
converted, or taken, knowing the same to have been stolen,
unlawfully converted, or taken shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
Besides making simple possession of stolen property criminal
under the NSPA, section 2315 also poses some of the most difficult
issues surrounding the NSPA. 8
First, is an art dealer a criminal simply for obtaining cultural
property from a country that has nationalized the ownership of its
cultural patrimony? Section 2315 requires an element of scienter to
protect any careless but innocent dealers. The language of scienter in
the statute suggests that a successful prosecution must prove that a
dealer has knowledge that an artifact in his possession is stolen in
light of the laws of its country of origin.' 9 In the three prosecutions
that have resulted in convictions, however, courts have, as in other
areas of criminal law, allowed such knowledge to be inferred from the
defendant's actions under the circumstances.20
Taken together, these two sections of the NSPA are meant to
15. Id.
16. Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a
Proposed LegalAlternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 395 (1995).
17. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2315 (2001).
18. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 219.
19. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2315 (2001).
20. Schultz II at 412; United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658, 668 n. 15 (5th Cir.
1979); United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1974).
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attack the demand side of the entire antiquities trade.' It is hoped by
NSPA prosecution proponents that imprisoning dealers in the United
States who trade in illegally imported artifacts will eventually
undercut the networks that supply such objects to the trade.22 There
are, however, at least three further complicating circumstances
inherent to the art, and especially the antiquities, trade that
complicate NSPA prosecutions and threaten the trade of legitimate
antiquities dealers. First, the vast amount of cultural objects that
have been excavated over the centuries and transported to other
countries make it nearly impossible for legitimate dealers in
antiquities to be sure, without extensive research, of the provenance
of the items that are offered for sale.23 Even with research, the
general lack of specificity and care in record-keeping within many
legitimate private collections allow for relatively easy fabrication of
believable, yet false, provenance. 24 A second complicating factor in
this situation is the art world tradition of trust and dealing on a
handshake amongst peers.25 Third, combining these lax formalities
with the fact that most dealers or galleries are very small business
entities consisting of two, three, or perhaps a handful of employees,
trust in dealing is as much a potential occupational hazard as it is a
necessity, for it is often felt that there are not enough hands, time, or
money to thoroughly research every piece offered for sale.26 Given
these difficulties for NSPA prosecutions, it is no wonder that the
three successful prosecutions that have occurred are separated by
decades and have proven to have very atypical and clear-cut sets of
facts.
27
21. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 219.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Borodkin, supra note 16, at 386-87.
25. Id. at 387.
26. Id.
27. Schultz had extensive and well-documented dealings with his co-conspirator
who handled the illegal exportation of the stolen antiquities. Schultz II at 412. The
conspirators in McClain suffered the misfortune of ignorantly offering their stolen
booty to a Mexican cultural center in San Antonio, Texas that happened to be run by
the illegally obtained artifacts' country of origin. United States v. McClain, 593 F. 2d
658, 660 (5th Cir. 1919). In Hollinshead, the lead defendant directly supervised each
step of the stolen artifact's journey to and within the United States from excavation
to transportation to presentation for sale. United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F. 2d
1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1974).
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Earlier NSPA Prosecutions
United States v. Hollinshead
The United States v. Hollinshead is the first case that resulted in
the successful prosecution of art smugglers under the NSPA.28 The
prosecution successfully applied the NSPA to convict the defendants
of conspiracy to transport stolen goods in interstate commerce
through Guatemala's national ownership law.29  The named
defendant, Hollinshead, acquired a Mayan stele in the Guatemalan
jungle, cut it in pieces and shipped it to California via Belize. ° The
defendants transported the stele within the United States attempting
to sell it to museums and collectors. Eventually, their efforts raised
suspicions and authorities were tipped off, leading to their arrest,
trial, and conviction.31 Hollinshead appealed on the grounds that the
prosecution did not show that the defendants had knowledge of the
foreign law.32 Guatemalan law states that all artifacts are the property
of the government and may not be removed without permission.33
The Ninth Circuit rejected Hollinshead's argument, adopting a broad
definition for the term "stolen" in the NSPA: "Stolen means acquired
or possessed, as a result of some wrongful or dishonest act or taking,
whereby a person willfully obtains or retains possession of property
which belongs to another, without or beyond any permission given,
and with the intent to deprive the owner of the benefit of
ownership."' Under this definition, prosecutors only need to show
that the defendants knew an item was stolen and not the laws of the
country of origin. 35 The court held that the defendants actions in
cutting the stele into smaller, more easily concealed, pieces for
smuggling and the roundabout method used to bring it to the United
States made evident the defendants actual knowledge that their
actions were illegal in Guatemala.36 Their conviction under the broad
definition of "stolen" which included artifacts removed in violation of
28. 495 F. 2d at 1156.





34. Id. at 1156.
35. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 220.
36. 495 F. 2d at 1156.
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a foreign country's cultural patrimony laws provides the basis for
future prosecutions under the NSPA.37 This definition allowed the
later prosecutions in United States v. McClain, and then Schultz, as
courts followed the concept that property removed from a country
with patrimony laws nationalizing its antiquities was in fact stolen.
United States v. McClain
The series of United States v. McClain cases borrowed the
definition of "stolen" from Hollinshead and used it to provide an
outline for the prosecutions of antiquities dealers under the NSPA.38
The defendants in McClain were convicted of substantive violations
of both sections 2314 and 2315 of the NSPA as well as conspiring to
violate these laws. 39 They had imported antiquities from Mexico and
tried to sell them to various institutions in the United States."°
Unfortunately for the smugglers, one of the institutions was actually a
branch of the Mexican national government.4
The McClain prosecution was complicated by the legislative
history of Mexican laws regarding protection of its antiquities.
4 2
Mexico implemented its cultural patrimony laws in phases.43 The first
phase was in 1897 and only covered its large monuments." Movable
artifacts, such as the antiquities in question, were not actually covered
by the laws until 1972." The substantive convictions obtained at the
initial trial were overturned and remanded as it was not established at
trial exactly when the artifacts had been brought into the United
States.'  Importantly, however, the Fifth Circuit did follow
Hollinshead in recognizing that ownership of artifacts by a
government as a basis for theft under the NSPA.47
After another round of convictions, the Fifth Circuit eventually
37. Gerstenblith, supra note 7, at 214-15.
38. United States v. McClain, 545 F. 2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977)("McClain I"), reh'g
denied, 551 F.2d 52, affd after new trial, 593 F. 2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979)("McClain II"),
cert. denied 444 U.S. 918 (1979).
39. 593 F. 2d at 659.
40. Id. at 659-60.
41. Id. at 660.
42. Id. at 666-67.
43. Id. at 666.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 667.
47. McClain I, 545 F. 2d at 994-97; McClain II, 593 F. 2d at 664.
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overturned the substantive convictions a second time because of the
vagueness of the Mexican laws." The court was concerned with Due
Process problems arising through the use of the Mexican laws.49
Evidence in the record, however, did show that the defendants
intended to trade further in illicit Mexican antiquities after the sale of
the collection for which they were arrested.0 This intent proved a
clear violation of the 1972 Mexican patrimony legislation and
demonstrated a further conspiracy to violate the NSPA."1 The
conspiracy convictions became the only ones the Fifth Circuit
upheld.52  The McClain cases, however, reaffirmed the broad
definition of "stolen" under the NSPA and laid further groundwork
for how to handle questions surrounding the implementation of
foreign cultural patrimony laws through the NSPA and obtain sound,
substantive convictions. 3 This groundwork was not tested for another
25 years, until the case of United States v. Schultz.
United States v. Schultz
The Violation
Frederick Schultz, along with a British national, used corrupt
connections within the Egyptian police force to acquire a variety of
antiquities in order to present them for sale in the United States over
a number of years. Among the antiquities were a sculptural head of
the pharaoh Amenhotep III that Schultz, the proprietor of a
prominent New York art gallery and former president of the National
Association of Dealers of Ancient, Oriental, and Primitive Art, sold
for $1.2 million in 1994."5 The smuggled artifacts were coated in
plastic and plaster and paint in order to appear to be cheap tourist
souvenirs and escape the interest of Egyptian customs authorities.56
The British national also concocted fake provenance showing the
antiquities to have come from a non-existent British collection that
48. McClain II, 593 F. 2d at 670-71.
49. Id. at 671.
50. Id. at 671-72.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Gerstenblith, supra note 7, at 216-17.
54. Schultz II, 124 S. Ct. at 395-96.




had supposedly acquired them in the 1920s. Once Schultz imported
the artifacts, he used this false provenance to offer the works in his
gallery in New York City and to prominent collectors and museums
throughout the United States. 8 Schultz was eventually convicted of
conspiracy to violate the NSPA, fined $50,000, and received a 33-
month sentence in a federal penitentiary. 9
The Defense
When first indicted in July 2001, Schultz moved to dismiss the
indictment on the ground that the antiquities were not stolen within
the NSPA's definition.' Schultz claimed that the Egyptian law did
not truly vest the ownership of the antiquities in the Egyptian
government.6' His theory was that, without vesting, they therefore
were not owned by anyone, so they could not have been stolen.62 The
prosecution countered with the Egyptian cultural patrimony law,
known as Law 117, which stated that all antiquities found in Egypt
after 1983 were the property of the Egyptian government. 63 The court
denied Schultz's motion after a short hearing.' At trial, a jury
convicted Schultz in February 2002.65
On appeal, Schultz offered several arguments to overturn his
conviction. First, Schultz appealed the outcome of the pre-trial
motion that found that Law 117 vested ownership of antiquities in the
Egyptian government and that even if Law 117 did vest ownership, it
was not a type of ownership the United States should recognize.
66
Schultz's most compelling argument, though, was his third: the NSPA
is superseded by the Convention on Cultural Property
Implementation Act.67 Schultz also tried out the arguments that the
common law definition of "stolen" should determine whether
antiquities were covered by the NSPA and that the district erred by
not allowing him to present a defense based on mistake of United
57. Id.
58. Id. at 395-98.
59. Id. at 398.
60. Schultz I at 446-48.
61. Id. at 447.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 446.
64. Id. at 449.
65. Schultz II at 395.
66. Id. at 398-99.
67. Id. at 409.
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States law. 8
The Second Circuit relied on the plain language of Law 117 as
enough to satisfy the requirement that ownership of the antiquities be
vested in the Egyptian government; Article 6 of the law clearly states
that "[a]ll antiquities are considered to be public property." 69 As well,
the court agreed with the prosecution-provided expert testimony that
Law 117 had also been used to prosecute violations that had taken
place entirely within Egyptian borders, showing that it was no mere
export prohibition.0 The Second Circuit further cited a body of
Supreme Court precedent urging that the NSPA "should be broadly
construed."'" The court also cited the McClain precedent in
disallowing Schultz's contention that the United States should not
apply Law 117 and its ownership provision.
Schultz's more novel third argument required further
consideration. The CPIA, enacted in 1983, is the United States
implementation of the customs regulations contained in the 1970
UNESCO Convention of which it is a signatory.73 The CPIA is a
network of international agreements to protect cultural patrimony
which functions at the request of a foreign sovereign.7 ' First, a
request is made to the President of the United States that he act to
protect artifacts that have reached the U.S. market. Unlike the
NSPA, a country need not have enacted cultural patrimony
legislation; it merely needs to be part of the UNESCO Convention to
have access to CPIA7 6 The CPIA creates the right to repatriation as
well as monetary penalties.77 To fall under CPIA prosecution, an
antiquities dealer would have to falsify customs documents, creating
criminal liability under United States' law.78  This liability is
independent of NSPA, and the potential penalties under the CPIA
68. Id. at 409-12.
69. Id. at 399.
70. Id. at 400-01.
71. Id. at 402 (citing McElroy v. United States, 445 U.S. 642, 655 (1982) and
United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 469 (2d Cir. 1991)(citing Moskal v. United
States, 498 U.S. 103, 113 (1990))).
72. Schultz II, 124 S. Ct. at 403.
73. Id. at 408.
74. S. Rep. No. 97-564, at 21 (1982).
75. Schultz II, 124 S. Ct. at 408.
76. Gerstenblith, supra note 7, at 222.
77. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 231
78. Id. at 232.
[Vol. 28: 3
Trading Places
are much less severe than NSPA.79
Schultz seized on this possibility to argue that the CPIA has
supplanted the NSPA, shifting his liability to charges with milder
penalties.' He claimed the CPIA was intended to be the only
mechanism by which the U.S. government deals with the illegal
importation of cultural property.81 Moreover, Schultz also tried an
argument that would have relieved him of all liability whatsoever.82
He claimed that the CPIA only bars the importation of items that
have been stolen from a museum or other cultural institution and is
not intended to cover artifacts excavated in violation of patrimony
laws.83
In answer to this argument, the Second Circuit stated that "[t]he
CPIA does not state that importing objects stolen from somewhere
other than a museum is legal." The court noted that the CPIA is
only meant to fill in the gaps left by the NSPA and that nothing in the
language of the CPIA suggests that it replaces the NSPA.85 In fact,
the legislative history of the CPIA shows that it "... neither pre-empts
state law in any way, nor modifies any Federal or State remedies that
may pertain to articles to which [the CPIA] provisions... apply.
'"86
The court ruled that the CPIA, therefore does not supplant liability
under the NSPA, rather, it creates new causes of action.87 It is
possible to violate both the NSPA and the CPIA when importing
objects into the United States.' Many antiquities dealers and
collectors fear that this potential for both criminal and civil charges
will have a deleterious effect on the trade, endangering their
livelihoods as well as the artifacts that are not only a source of income
but also beauty, pleasure, and knowledge.
The Possible Chilling Effect of Schultz on the Antiquities Trade
"The importance of the Schultz quake and its aftershocks on the
79. Schultz II, 124 S. Ct. at 408-09.
80. Id. at 408.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 408-09.
83. Id. at 408.
84. Id. at 408-09.
85. Id. at 408.
86. Senate Rep. No. 97-564 at 22 (1982).
87. Id. at 409.
88. Id. at 408-09.
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antiquities market cannot be underestimated." 9 "The question of
cultural patrimony, or who has the right to own and exhibit the
artefacts[sic] of other nations, is already one of the most highly vexed
issues in the art world."' The amicus brief filed with the Second
Circuit on behalf of Schultz states that the district court's decision
"threatens the viability of the segment of the art market and museum
community that collects, exhibits and deals in antiquities and cultural
objects imported into the United States."'"
Legitimate dealers in antiquities fear criminal prosecution with
stiff penalties for making mistakes in scholarship. The Antiquities
Trade Gazette notes:
[A]nyone wishing to deal in Egyptian antiquities in the US
will have to be able to show cast-iron provenances going back
to before 1983 for any piece, regardless of its cultural or
economic value. As the nature of antiquities - often dug up
after thousands of years - means that firm provenances are
rarely possible, the ruling is likely to blight a huge number of
transactions. ' '9'
"The legitimate trade and ownership of cultural properties are at
risk," impacting professional appraisers, private collectors, antiquities
dealers and museum curators, notes Edwin W. Baker, ASA executive
vice president. 93 "The pendulum has swung too far against antiquities
dealers and collectors," says William Pearlstein, an attorney at
Golenbock Eisman, who represents dealers and collectors. "It is
harder and harder for collectors to know what is safe to collect."94
One publication directed towards dealers and collectors of
ancient art presented Schultz's situation in histrionic terms:
Imagine this scenario: government prosecutors accuse you of
89. Trace Media Resources, The Frederick Schultz Affair, CASE STUDIES, at
<http://www.trace.co.uk/resources/media/casestudies/police/FrederickSchultz>
(visited Mar. 6, 2004).
90. Steven Vincent, Commentary: The Stake in the Schultz Trial, ORIENTATIONS
INTERNET EDITION, at <http://www.kaleden.com/articles/3322.html> (visited Mar. 6,
2004).
91. American Society of Appraisers, supra note 6.
92. Ruling a Major Blow to U.S. Antiquities Trade,
ANTIQUITIESTRADEGAZETrE.COM, at
<http://www.antiquestradegazette.com/news/news-articlemain.asp?id=1809&pt=nb
> (Jan. 21, 2002).
93. American Society of Appraisers, supra note 6.
94. Nathan Vardi, The Return of the Mummy, FORBES.COM, at
<http://www.forbes.com/forbes/s003/1222/156.html> (Dec. 22, 2003).
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attempting to sell several objects which they contend your business
partner stole from a foreign country - even though that country
never made a claim for the objects, and its law defining ownership
is written in a language incomprehensible to you, while your own
nation's statutes on this point are unclear. Moreover, in building
their case against you, prosecutors rely mainly on the testimony of
your business partner - a convicted criminal and con artist who, out
of motives of profit and revenge, repeatedly lied, misled you and
manipulated you. Worse, because of the nature of the charges, your
government does not have to prove you actually 'stole' these
objects - just that you believed that even 'one' object was stolen
when you tried to sell it. As if that weren't enough, even if you did
not realize what you were doing was wrong, but the jury thinks that
you 'consciously avoided' discovering the truth, you are guilty.
This, in essence, is the legal situation that Frederick Schultz, a well-
respected New York antiquities dealer, has faced .... 95
Such fears do appear to have some basis in reality. For much of
history, the world-wide trade in artifacts was largely unregulated and
often the formalities of importation and exportation were lax.96
Theoretically, antiquities that were legally exported, but not
completely documented, before a source-country's patrimony law
took effect will, post-Schultz, lose value in the marketplace as
collectors and museums would risk litigation by their acquisition. 97
Some scholars welcome such an outcome: "Our belief is that if people
find it difficult to sell these objects on the art market, if they fear the
objects might be seized and they might end in court, it might be a
deterrent," says Nancy Wilkie, president of the Archaeological
Institute of America.98
Proponents of the trade in antiquities also fear the damage that
could be done to the collecting programs of American museums and a
decimation of the cultural knowledge and understanding that such
collections promote. Jonathan Bloom, a lawyer in the firm of Weil,
Gotshal & Manges, which represents four dealers' groups, has
commented that "[h]ad this legal regime been in place in say 1875,
then we wouldn't have the kind of art collections that we have today
95. Steven Vincent, Commentary: Schultz Convicted, ORIENTATIONS:INTERNET
EDITION, at <http://www.kaleden.com/articles/3344.html> (visited Mar. 8, 2004).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Celestine Bohlen, The Trial of a Dealer Divides the Art World,
THISDAYONLINE.COM, at <http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2002/02/03/20020203
art03.html> (July 31, 2003).
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in American museums." 9  William Pearlstein, a lawyer for the
National Association of Dealers in Ancient, Oriental and Primitive
Art (an organization of which Schultz was once President) cited the
public interest in positioning the NADAOPA's support of Schultz:
"What the United States is doing is quite radical and quite to the
contrary of the interest of museums, the public, the dealers and the
auction houses. I think the government is out to squelch the
antiquities trade, and no one is taking into account the interest of the
public it serves. ' °
An eminent antiquities dealer, writing for The Wall Street
Journal, defends the trade's commodification of cultural property for
its effective conservation of artifacts:
Contrary to what some believe, trade in ancient objects is not the
enemy of preservation. The great contribution the art market
makes to this cause is to endow works of art with value. When
objects have no value they are inevitably at grave risk of
destruction because preserving them is a costly enterprise. Storing,
safeguarding, heating and air conditioning, and conserving art can
only be done for a relatively few things. In practice, there is a
constant triage which saves a few treasured objects while
consigning the remainder to destruction through benign neglect.11
This dealer further touts the international trade in antiquities as
having the effect of dispersing important cultural treasures
throughout the world and protecting them from local disasters, citing
the recent looting of antiquities from the Iraqi museums as evidence
of the dangers putting "all your eggs in one basket" by leaving source
countries in control of their own heritage.""
Whether the Schultz decision will have the profound effects the
proponents of such policy arguments purvey remains to be seen.
There are, however, some likely reasons why the consequences of
Schultz will not be as dire as predicted.
The Potential Benefits of Schultz to the Antiquities Trade
The antiquities trade is a market that has become gradually more
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regulated over the past 100 years. The Schultz decision is only the
implementation of a regulation that drives market forces. The law of
supply and demand in the antiquities has been astutely described as
follows:
[T]he world divides itself into source nations and market nations. In
source nations, the supply of desirable cultural property exceeds
the internal demand. Nations like Mexico, Egypt, Greece, and
India are obvious examples. They are rich in cultural artifacts
beyond any conceivable local use. In market nations, the demand
exceeds the supply. France, Germany, Japan, the Scandinavian
nations, Switzerland, and the United States are examples. Demand
in the market nation encourages export from source nations.
When, as is often (but not always) the case, the source nation is
relatively poor and the market nation wealthy, an unrestricted
103market will encourage the net export of cultural property.
If the Schultz regime creates a reduction in the number of
illegally obtained antiquities on the market originating from source
countries, the law of supply and demand will by logic put a price-
premium on legally obtained and documented artifacts. The result
will be higher per sale prices for documented antiquities, providing
higher commissions for dealers. Following this train of logic to its
conclusion points to a situation with a lower volume of sales but a
higher per sale profit, in other words, legitimate antiquities dealers
will have greater resources and more time, as well as a bigger
incentive, to properly research items offered to them and by them.
Again, by this logic, the result could be more identifications and
repatriations of illegally obtained antiquities. If proper
documentation becomes less of a burden, it will become accepted as
routine. Hamilton, a partner in the Washington-based Trans-Art
International Gallery, notes, "People are required to do a title search
when they buy a house or a car. It's mystifying why this hasn't
become standard practice in the art world.""°  Since the Schultz
decision has been affirmed, prominent dealers have become
increasingly vigilant:
I think fifteen years ago, people took a more relaxed view of things,
says James Ede, a London-based dealer and head of the
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International Association of Dealers in Ancient Art, "The feeling
was that these were stupid laws, they were laws in other countries,
they didn't apply to us. Today, that feeling has completely
changed.10'
Another oft-noted potential benefit resulting from an increased
price for legally obtained antiquities (and the increased competition
to acquire them) is that museums will be able to benefit through the
sale of duplicate items within their collections.1" These funds can go
to further the educational goals of the institution. A similar incentive
could work to allow poorer source countries to benefit from the sale
of antiquities excavated and properly documented under their
cultural patrimony laws.1 While beyond the scope of this writing, a
number of potentially workable proposals have been made to develop
a legal, managed market in antiquities for the benefit of museums and
source countries9
Conclusion
The Schultz decision undeniably provides for prosecution as a
powerful regulating device over the formerly free-wheeling
international trade in antiquities. The prison sentence given to this
prominent member of the trade -will cause other dealers to have
second thoughts about the source of their wares. The proof of the
effectiveness of implementing the NSPA in the antiquities trade
should be judged by the effects on the market for antiquities and
whether benefits accrue for education and preservation within the
source countries for artifacts and in the world-at-large.
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